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Adaptive and optimum secret key establishment for
vehicular communications and sensing
Abstract—Confidentiality is a major concern in any wireless1
communication, especially so in vehicular networks where cyber-2
attacks easily evolve in the loss of human lives or assets. In these3
scenarios, the current proposed approach relies on public-key4
cryptography which, however, requires significant computational5
capabilities for the encryption/decryption process and large6
bandwidth for keys distribution. To overcome these limitations,7
physical-layer security has been proposed to provide confiden-8
tiality by exploiting the physical characteristics of the wireless9
medium. Nonetheless, the high dynamicity and heterogeneity of10
vehicular environments require the design of secure protocols11
that are able to self-configure and adapt to all conditions, free12
from any fixed choice of parameters. In this paper, we propose13
a secure scheme composed by a novel quantisation approach14
in which thresholds are analytically derived from the statistics15
of the channel, mathematically guaranteeing the robustness of16
the protocol. Moreover, we design an optimisation engine to17
continuously adapt the system to run in its optimal conditions.18
The performance of the proposed scheme is evaluated through19
extensive simulation in order to demonstrate its significant20
improvement to the existing approach.21
Index Terms—Physical layer security, Lossy quantisation,22
VANETs, Channel Reciprocity Adaptation, RSS23
I. INTRODUCTION24
WIreless communication technologies provide the essen-25 tial scalability required by the continuous increase of26
interconnected devices. In the case of Intelligent Transport27
Systems (ITS), electrical engineering together with computer28
science as well as, transport engineering and communica-29
tion networks synergistically collaborate to improve transport30
safety and quality. ITS services span across different areas, as31
in the Advanced Traveller Information System, which provides32
drivers with real-time route information and the Advanced33
Transportation Management System that coordinates traffic34
control devices. Nonetheless, the most anticipated ITS appli-35
cations arise from vehicle-infrastructure and vehicle-vehicle36
integrations. These applications rely on the collaboration be-37
tween vehicles and road infrastructure and hence becomes the38
key factor in reducing the risk of accidents and environmental39
impact. A typical vehicle ad-hoc network (VANET) includes40
on-board units (OBUs) and road-side units (RSUs) which41
communicate through dedicated short-range communication42
(DSRC). Security is the first priority [1], [2] as the wireless43
medium opens up the possibility for unauthorised users to44
passively eavesdrop and/or to alter the transmissions [3].45
Data confidentiality is traditionally provided by cryptographic46
mechanisms implemented in upper layers of the Open System47
Interconnection (OSI) model. Encryption approaches can be48
classified in two categories: symmetric (secret key) and asym- 49
metric (public key) solutions [4]. 50
The present security proposal is based on public-key in- 51
frastructure (PKI) to provide authentication, confidentiality, 52
identity and non-repudiation. PKI cryptographic primitives are 53
computationally complex and OBUs may still need hundreds 54
of milliseconds to complete such operations, responsible for 55
unacceptable delays when transmitting safety-related messages 56
[5]. Furthermore, PKI is intrinsically a centralised approach 57
where a trusted authority distributes and manages keys and 58
certificates however, its adaptation to highly distributed and 59
ad-hoc network rises scalability challenges [6]. On the other 60
hand, symmetric cryptography is more power/computational 61
efficient than PKI but its applications are drastically limited 62
by the delicate tasks of distributing and storing the secret keys. 63
Distribution usually requires a secondary secure channel which 64
is hardly feasible, especially in VANETs due to their highly 65
dynamic topology. 66
In these challenging scenarios, Physical Layer Security 67
(PLS) has emerged as a technique to provide unconditionally 68
secure communications by efficiently exploiting the wireless 69
medium [7] as a shared source of randomness to extract 70
symmetric keys. Randomness is a consequence of the unpre- 71
dictability of the multipath phenomena [8], where the received 72
wireless signal is altered by the superposition of different 73
transmitted echoes, coming from different paths with different 74
phases. Keys are generated through the quantisation of channel 75
properties, which are considered stochastic processes, such as 76
the Received Signal Strength (RSS) or the phase [9]. Keys 77
distribution is avoided by channel reciprocity principle, which 78
states that in sufficiently small-time intervals, referred to as 79
coherence intervals, the Channel Impulse Response (CIR) is 80
substantially constant [10]. This way, the communicating par- 81
ties can probe the channel in an interleaved fashion, obtaining 82
similar estimates inside the same intervals and therefore, gen- 83
erating the same keys. Nonetheless, estimates gathered by third 84
entities are statistically uncorrelated due to spatial and time 85
variability of multipath phenomena, leading to different useless 86
keys and providing confidentiality to the communication. 87
In the PLS process, quantisation plays a crucial role since 88
its performance greatly affects the overall system efficiency 89
and robustness. Quantisation not only does it transform an 90
analogous physical quantity in a stream of discrete numbers, 91
but it also reduces differences among estimates taken by the 92
legitimate parties, even in the same coherence interval. These 93
variations are caused by hardware differences, asymmetric 94
noise and mainly, by the half-duplex nature of wireless de- 95
vices, unable to receive and transmit at the same time [11].96
All these effects are included in the term imperfect reciprocity.97
Even a single different bit makes the generated keys unusable,98
nullifying all efforts in the extraction process.99
Another aspect to be taken into account is the entropy (H) of100
the extracted sequences, which measures their level of random-101
ness [12]. The latter is a crucial property of cryptographic keys102
to remove possible statistical defects that could ease the attacks103
conducted by adversaries with active or passive presence to the104
channel [13].105
What makes the design of PLS-protocols challenging, is the106
conflicting relationship among the throughput of the quantisa-107
tion (bit-generation rate or BGR), the inevitable presence of108
erroneous bits (bit-mismatch rate or BMR) and the entropy109
of the resulting streams. In their attempt to optimise the cor-110
responding proposed schemes, most literature sources address111
only a subset of the metrics introduced above, coming up with112
resulting in sub-optimal results [9].113
Only few protocols in literature take the imperfect reci-114
procity into account [14], [15], [16] considered as a constant115
aspect of the environment. In other the studies [17], [18] non-116
reciprocity is simply ignored during quantisation and fully117
tackled in the error correction stage. Furthermore, to the best118
of our knowledge, there isn’t a scheme which considers a con-119
tinuously varying reciprocity due to changing environmental120
conditions and dynamic network topology. To fill these gaps,121
to the best of our knowledge, for the first time in the existing122
literature:123
1) We prove the existence of optimal thresholding strategies124
within a two-level RSS-based quantisation block, which125
strike an optimal balance among the evaluation metrics126
(BGR, BMR and H). Moreover, thresholds are not127
fixed system parameters but continuously derived by128
the channel’s statistics. Specifically, we introduce the129
use of the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) and130
Average Fade Duration (AFD) to mathematically create131
equiprobable regions. This way, our scheme outperforms132
the classical implementation proposed in [19], providing133
the minimum BMR, the maximum BGR and the maxi-134
mum key entropy H.135
2) We address the continuously varying reciprocity of the136
channel with the introduction of a novel Perturb &137
Observe algorithm. In a two-steps approach, we first138
unify BMR and BGR under a criterion named as secret-139
bit generation rate (SBGR) that accounts for the number140
of correct bits per channel sample hence, representing an141
efficient comparator for different quantisation schemes.142
Secondly, we design and develop the algorithm acting as143
a feedback in the key-extraction process. This algorithm144
is self-configurable and able to adapt to sharp changes145
in the channel and reciprocity parameters, while con-146
tinuously observing the SBGR performance to adjust147
quantisation thresholds accordingly.148
The remaining part of this paper is organised as follows:149
Section II reviews existing studies on PLS in vehicle-to-vehicle150


















Fig. 1. PLS Key extraction process: Alice and Bob exchange probes in order
to agree on a key.
tion III introduces the V2V channel model and the quantisation 152
performance metrics; Section IV explains the novel techniques 153
of analytical thresholding, introducing and underlying the 154
proposed optimisation algorithm. Section V compares and 155
contrasts the simulations’ results with the standard level- 156
crossing method (hereinafter referred to as STD) [19]. Finally, 157
Section VI draws the conclusions of the present piece of 158
research. 159
II. RELATED WORKS 160
The research branch on PLS started with Wyner [20] who 161
showed how it is possible to establish secure transmissions 162
in scenarios where the eavesdropper (Eve) has a lower qual- 163
ity channel available than the communicating nodes (Alice 164
and Bob). This difference of links’ quality translates into 165
a difference of channel capacities, referred to as secrecy 166
capacity, which can be exploited to send private information. 167
Maurer [21] and Ahlswede-Csiszar [22] demonstrated that 168
confidentiality is also achievable when the attacker observes a 169
higher quality link than the one available to authorised parties. 170
Their technique is based on the extraction of a secret key over 171
the public and insecure channel. 172
The key extraction process is shown in figure 1 and com- 173
posed by three fundamental steps: advantage-distillation, in- 174
formation reconciliation and privacy amplification. In the first 175
phase, legitimate parties probe the channel, in order to acquire 176
a number of estimates proportional to the desired key-length. 177
To collect correlated measurements, Alice and Bob must 178
sense the medium inside the same coherence time, defined 179
as the time period over which the channel impulse response is 180
considered constant. Coherence time depends on the Doppler 181
effects due to nodes mobility [8]. Extracted estimates are then 182
converted into bit-streams through quantisation and sent to the 183
information reconciliation phase. The latter has the duty to fix 184
any bit disagreements with the aid of error correcting codes 185
and public discussion through the insecure channel. A widely 186
used technique is CASCADE [23] in which parties randomly 187
permute the sequences and recursively exchange parity check188
information. More sophisticated schemes are based on turbo189
codes [17] and low-density parity check (LDPC) [24] which190
both try to maximise reconciliation capabilities as well as,191
simultaneously minimise the leakage of information to the192
eavesdropper. Alice and Bob’s sequences should now be193
identical, otherwise the entire extraction process is restarted.194
However, to use such strings as keys, the last step of privacy195
amplification strengthens them by improving their entropy, as196
for example with the application of universal hash functions197
and/or one-way functions [25].198
This investigation focuses on the RSS quantisation for199
its ease of use and the immediate availability in all out-200
of-the-shelf wireless devices [26]. Furthermore, RSS greatly201
benefits from nodes’ mobility, the main property of VANETs,202
generating keys at a fast rate and with high entropy. In their203
pioneer study [27], Tope et al. analysed the signal attenuation204
by collecting estimates of the envelope of received packets205
and storing them into arrays. By subtracting half of the206
latter from the other half, the scheme removed the path-207
loss contribution, which is correlated to distance and hence208
predicable. Two thresholds were used to drop estimates that209
have a high probability of being either foreseeable or converted210
to mismatching bits. Azimi-Sadjadi et al. [28] proposed the211
use of deep fades or local minima of the signal to improve212
keys agreement. Deep fades were detected by first quantising213
RSS estimates, using a single threshold and then by searching214
for runs of 1-bits of sufficient length. At this point, Alice215
can transmit the hash of the generated key to Bob, who216
compensates any disagreements by exploring a small search-217
space due to deep fades’ statistical properties. Inspired by218
the previous idea, Mathur et al. [19] introduced a quantiser219
with two thresholds, whose distance is proportional to the220
standard deviation of an array of estimates. The quantisation221
bin between thresholds is referred to as censor or invalid222
region, where values are dropped because of their high proba-223
bility of disagreement. Furthermore, only the estimates located224
inside sequences of sufficient excursions above or below the225
thresholds are considered to discard sharp changes in the signal226
amplitude. This constraint has been relaxed in a few derived227
works [17], [29], [30], where the increased error probability228
was counterbalanced by a more efficient reconciliation tech-229
nique. Instead of using absolute thresholds, the research [31]230
proposed a differential approach where quantisation operates231
on the difference between two consecutive RSS values. This232
way, the scheme is able to provide better results, while being233
resistant to RSS-manipulation attacks. Since increasing the234
number of quantisation levels could have a negative impact on235
BMR, the study [32] introduced the use of vector quantisation236
to increase BGR. In the latter, RSS estimates are reused n237
times, where n is the dimension of the vector. While this238
approach could achieve better BGR without increasing BMR,239
it remains to investigate the security aspects related to the es-240
timates’ recycling. VANETs communication constraints have241
been considered in [33], where the authors designed a key-242











Fig. 2. V2V channel model: two vehicles are moving in a three-dimensional
environment including mobile scatterers.
of the specific scenario, such as the location of the parties and 244
an estimate of the coherence time, the algorithm attempts to 245
extract a key with as much robustness as possible. 246
Only few protocols in literature take the imperfect reci- 247
procity into account. Half-duplex limitations are addressed 248
in [14], [15] by applying fractional interpolation in order 249
to virtually measure estimates at the same time instants. 250
Moreover, non-reciprocity due to hardware differences are 251
removed with a ranking method in [16]. In [34] noise is 252
reduced by smoothing the readings, using sliding windows 253
whose weights are collaboratively generated by Alice and Bob. 254
III. CHANNEL MODEL AND PERFORMANCE METRICS 255
The high dynamicity of VANETs constantly changes the 256
physical characteristics of the wireless media. In fact, the mul- 257
tipath phenomena induce a time-variant impulse response, the 258
receiver to collect a train of echoes of the transmitted message, 259
which travels different paths and arrives at the destination 260
with different delays and attenuation factors [8]. Just as the 261
mobility of vehicles and intermediate objects appear to be un- 262
predictable, so are the multipath effects on the received signals. 263
In deterministic channel models, the propagation environment 264
is recreated through ray-tracing techniques [35]. Nonetheless, 265
a detailed description of both objects’ specific coordinates and 266
electrical characteristics is crucial to achieve accurate results, 267
rendering this approach hardly generalisable to all possible 268
operating conditions. On the other hand, stochastic models 269
consider the wireless medium as a random process, whose 270
statistics provide an inner sight of the channel properties [36]. 271
Moreover, random approaches provide numerical stability and 272
combine high performances and ease of implementation. For 273
these reasons, in the current investigation we opted to use a 274
generic stochastic model [37], which proved to be a complete, 275
configurable and tuneable model for key-generation. 276
A. V2V generic stochastic model 277
Figure 2 shows the considered three-dimensional V2V sce- 278
nario, where propagation’s parameters and entities’ locations 279
are driven by a Monte Carlo process [38], [39]. Two vehicles, 280
Alice and Bob, are equipped with a single antenna and move281
at speeds uA(B). Alice’s signals are received by Bob as the282
superposition of a number L of different echoes, unresolvable283
in delay. Each l-th multipath component reaches its destination284
with a specific complex amplitude al and phase φl caused by285
the different path it has travelled. To adequately approximate286
a trafficked urban scenario, we also considered the interaction287
with mobile scatterers moving at speed uS [37].288
In this environment, Alice’s channel estimates GA are289





where t is the time and vl the Doppler shift of the l-th291
multipath component. The latter is the sum of the contributions292
of the transmitter vA,l, receiver vB,l and scatterers vS,l, as293
follows:294
vl = vA,l + vB,l + vS,l (2)
295
vA(B),l = vA(B)max cosαA(B),l cosβA(B),l (3)
296
vS,l = vSWb(cosα1,l + cosα2,l) (4)
In the previous equations, αA(B),l and βA(B),l are azimuth297
and elevation angles of departure (arrival) and α1,l, α2,l cor-298
respond to the incoming and outcoming components at the299
mobile scatterer. Maximum Doppler shifts vA(B)max arise300









= uSWb · fc/c (6)
where uA(B)max are the corresponding maximum velocities,303
λ is the carrier’s wavelength at frequency fc and c is the speed304
of light. The speed of mobile scatterers vSWb is randomised305
through a Weibull distribution, in order to adequately associate306
most multipath power contribution to static and slowly moving307
objects [37] thus,308




having scale wWb and shape aWb. Once we have Alice’s309
estimates we need to properly generate the corresponding310
Bob’s values in order to realistically simulate the effects of311
imperfect reciprocity. This loss of correlation is the direct312
consequence of slightly different channel state information313
(CSI) sensed by legitimate parties. According to the study [40],314
that difference is composed by a stable component and a noisy315
part, which are estimated after a non-reciprocity learning phase316













The stable portion µt is removed by the Channel Gain Com- 318
plement (CGC) method, leaving only the noisy component 319
which is assumed to follow a zero-mean Gaussian distribution, 320
thus N(0, σ2C). Bob’s values can now be obtained adding a 321
normal random variable to Alice’s estimates as follows: [40]: 322
GB(t) = GA(t) +N(0, σ
2
C) (10)
The impact of the noisy component usually depends on 323
the environmental conditions, which are dynamic and unpre- 324
dictable, especially in VANETs. In this respect, our proposed 325
algorithm aims to rapidly adapt quantisation thresholds to 326
the available amount of channel reciprocity, modelled as a 327
continuously changing standard deviation σC . 328
B. Key performance metrics 329
In order to compare the proposed algorithm to the other 330
schemes in literature, it is necessary to introduce the perfor- 331
mance metrics [41]. The quantisation performance is measured 332
by the bit generation rate (BGR), which is the average number 333
of bits that can be extracted per channel estimate or per unit 334
time. The former definition is preferable, as it does not depend 335





Higher value of BGR indicates a faster production of bit- 337
streams which, in turn, translates to keys being generated in 338
less time and hence refreshed continuously. 339
Another relevant performance criterion is the bit-mismatch 340
rate (BMR) defined as the ratio of the number of erroneous 341
bits (i.e. they don’t match between Alice and Bob) to the total 342





BMR determines the system resilience against noise and 344
interferences, defined after the quantisation stage or after the 345
information reconciliation. In the first case, BMR depends only 346
on how the quantisation space is configured (as for example 347
the number of thresholds). On the other hand, if BMR is 348
defined after information reconciliation, it will also embrace 349
the error-correcting capabilities of the protocol, having the 350
unrecoverable bits at the numerator. As our thresholding 351
optimisation engine aims to increase the number of valid keys, 352
it is reasonable to define BMR after reconciliation, taking 353
advantage of any implementation of the latter. 354
Considering that the extracted sequences will be treated 355
as cryptographic keys, it is important they possess enough 356
entropy, ideally close to 1, to maximise the uncertainty from 357
an attacker’s point of view. Entropy of bit i is measured by 358
the following formula [17]: 359
Hi = −p0,i log p0,i − (1− p0,i) log(1− p0,i) (13)
where p0,i is the posterior probability of bit i being 0. The360
maximum value of 1 indicates equal probability of having361
bits 1 or 0, i.e. p0 = 1 − p0 = 0.5. For independent bit-362
strings of length N , the total entropy is defined as Htotal =363
(
∑N
i=1Hi)/N . Entropy alone is not sufficient to prove the364
absence of statistical defects in the bit sequences. For example,365
they may contain long runs of the same bit and the repetition366
of sub-parts. For these reasons, in all our tests we also evaluate367
key robustness against the random-tests suite, provided by the368
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [13].369
IV. ANALYTICAL QUANTISATION THRESHOLDING370
Our secret-key extraction algorithm follows from work371
introduced in [19], where legitimate nodes locally convert372
their RSS-estimates in bit-streams, prior to symmetric key373
generation. Channel probing is done in half-duplex mode,374
hence Alice and Bob extract samples from the same coherence375
intervals in an interleaved fashion. The inability to probe at376
the same time instants introduces a small, yet unpredictable377
variation in the channel response. The latter, together with378
other environmental factors, reduce the channel reciprocity as379
well as, increase the probability of extracting different key-380
candidates thus, they reduce the effectiveness of the extraction381
process. In order to reduce BMR, we apply a two-level382
“censor” quantisation function defined as follows:383
Q(x) =

1, if x > q+
0, if x < q−
dropped otherwise
(14)
Estimates in the interval q− ≤ x ≤ q+ are dropped in384
accordance with their higher probability of being translated385
into different bits at both communication ends. On the other386
hand, the censor region has a direct impact of the throughput of387
the quantisation stage and its size should be set as the optimal388
trade-off between BMR and BGR metrics. In STD thresholds389
were originally computed using average and standard deviation390
of an array of samples h, thus391
q± = average(h)± αSTD · stdev(h) (15)
where parameter αSTD expresses the relationship between392
the censor region and how spread out the values are and is393
set empirically. To compare STD with our proposed methods394
we define a novel metric, namely the secret-bit generation395
rate (SBGR), as the ratio of the number of bits which are396
successfully used to compose keys to the total amount of397





Remembering that BMR is defined after information recon-399
ciliation, the number of keybits corresponds to the amount of400








Fig. 3. SBGR against αSTD for different non-reciprocity factors in the
standard censor approach.
successfully generated bits after errors correction, which can 401
be expressed as 402
no.keybits ≤ no.samples ·BGR · (1−BMR) (17)
where the less-than-equal symbol arises from the fact that 403
a single erroneous bit eventually compromises an entire key. 404
By merging equations 16 and 17 405
SBGR ≤ BGR · (1−BMR) (18)
Equation 18 elicits how the new metric embraces both 406
the effects of BGR and BMR. Moreover, SBGR is evaluated 407
after errors correction, making the optimisation engine capable 408
of taking advantage of any existing or future reconciliation 409
schemes. Figure 3 shows SBGR against different invalid region 410
sizes modelled through the parameter αSTD in e.q. 15 and 411
for different non-reciprocity settings, represented by standard 412
deviation σC in e.q. 9. SBGR performance increases as 413
channel non-reciprocity (σC) reduces. Simulation parameters 414
are shown in table I. 415
Given the fact that all curves express a single (global) 416
maximum, a Hill-climbing algorithm seems to be a simple, 417
yet effective approach to locate the point with highest perfor- 418
mance. The idea is to ‘modulate’ the quantisation thresholds, 419
according to the resulting SBGR, in an attempt to identify 420
the optimal set-point. However, as stated in the introduction, a 421
high entropy H of the generated bit-streams is a mandatory 422
requirement to guarantee the statistical robustness of the 423
resulting symmetric keys. As this aspect is not covered by 424
the definition of SBGR, we decided to mathematically relate 425
the thresholds to ensure the maximum entropy. 426
A. CDF-based thresholding strategy 427
The first proposed strategy is based on the cumulative 428
distribution function (CDF) FX(·). In the case of two-level 429
quantisation, optimal key-entropy is guaranteed by forcing430
thresholds q± to generate equiprobable regions, thus431
FX(q−) = Pr(−∞ < x ≤ q−)
= Pr(q+ ≤ x < +∞) = 1− FX(q+) (19)
In the absence of a significant line-of-sight (LOS) com-432
ponent, Rayleigh distribution has proved to model channel433
propagation adequately [37]. Rayleigh’s CDF is defined as434
follows:435












) = 1− FX(q+) (21)
where upper threshold q+ can be derived by applying the437
logarithm to the reciprocal of the first side (due to the minus438












B. ADF-based thresholding strategy441
The second proposed method is based on the use of average442
fade duration (AFD), a second-order statistical parameter,443
which should better capture channel variabilities and simul-444
taneously maintain a sufficient level of key robustness. AFD445
is defined as446
T (z) = FX(z)/N(z) (23)
that is, the ratio between the cumulative distribution function447
FX(·) and the level crossing rate (LCR) N(·). In Rayleigh448












where parameter d1 depends on vehicles’ speeds and multi-450
path angular spread (see [37] for details). The core concept451
in this method is to ensure that when a signal crosses a452
threshold, it will remain in the corresponding region for the453
same (averaged) time duration. Mathematically,454
T (q−) = T
c(q+) (25)
where T c(z) = (1 − FX(z))/N(z) is also commonly455



















































= T c(q+) (26)













Once again, the upper threshold q+ can be derived from the 459








Whenever it is needed to adapt the quantisation thresholds, 461
the two proposed strategies provide an analytic way to derive 462
the invalid region’s boundaries, enforcing maximum entropy 463
as well as, preparing the ground for the upcoming SBGR 464
optimisation block. 465
C. Thresholds Optimisation engine 466
In this section we introduce an optimisation algorithm 467
in the standard process of key extraction to recognise the 468
maximum SBGR performance of the system without relying 469
on the choice of fixed quantisation parameters. Figure 4 470
shows that the novel block acts as feedback from the stage 471
information reconciliation to adapt the quantisation parameters 472
by continuously monitoring the output of the key-extraction 473
process. Inside this block, a Perturb & Observe (PO) algorithm 474
constantly alters the invalid region size and monitors the 475
effects on the resulting SBGR. In doing so, PO can adapt to 476
different scenarios, even within the ones with variable channel 477
reciprocity, a common condition holding in VANETs. For the 478
sake of simplicity, the algorithm perturbs the size of the censor 479
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Fig. 5. A simplified view of the optimisation block: reconciliation outcome
is used to adapt thresholds distance.
threshold q− and leaving the corresponding upper threshold481
q+ computed accordingly to the chosen strategy (CDF-based482
or AFD-based). Figure 5 shows the intuitive underlying idea:483
if the generated bitstreams are different after reconciliation,484
this indicates a decrease in channel reciprocity, which should485
be balanced by a larger censor region. On the other hand,486
matching keys suggest the possibility to reduce thresholds’487
distance further, thus, aiming for higher BGR.488
The frequency with which the system should be perturbed489
must be carefully chosen: if thresholds are modulated too490
often, they can generate a significant oscillation around the491
optimal SBGR, preventing complete convergence. On the other492
hand, if the algorithm does not calibrate itself fast enough, it493
may not be able to reach optimality before the medium has494
moved to a different reciprocity condition. To strike a balance,495
it seems reasonable to perturb quantisation bins after a mini-496
mum number of events. More specifically, the algorithm waits497
for a number INTSUCCESS of successful keys before reduc-498
ing the censor size and a number of INTFAIL failed attempts499
before increasing it. Usually INTFAIL ≤ INTSUCCESS500
because it is safer to faster adapt to worse conditions than501
to improve already good ones.502
Another improvement stems from the consideration that503
when the algorithm has successfully reached the optimal504
point, even the smallest positive and negative perturbance505
would possibly result in a waste of bits or the total rejection506
of the generated bitstreams. For that reason, the algorithm507
simultaneously quantifies the channel estimates against three508




± whose lower parts are spaced509











− − δ (30)
Considering that the formulae 22 and 28 are decreasing512















Recalling that smaller regions generate higher BGR as well515
















































Fig. 6. Flowchart of PO algorithm where quantisation thresholds are adjusted
to achieve the maximum key-generation rate.
gressive thresholds q(1)± , neutral thresholds q
(2)
± and defensive 517
thresholds q(3)± which will be further evaluated in this specific 518
order. 519
Figure 6 shows the complete algorithm flowchart, which can 520
be best explained by considering three possible conditions: 521
firstly, the algorithm is using a censor region’s size which is 522
larger than the optimal one for the current reciprocity factor, 523
dropping estimates that can be safely transformed into keybits. 524
In that case it is highly probable that aggressive thresholds 525
q
(1)
± will be adequate to generate keys at a faster rate. If this 526
condition is held for INTSUCCESS times, it is reasonable to 527
consider these thresholds as neutral, assigning q(2)± = q
(1)
± and 528
recalculating the others according to formulae 29 and 30. Sec- 529
ondly, when the algorithm reaches the maximum and channel 530
reciprocity is stable, it is more likely that neutral thresholds 531
q
(2)




DATASIZE 50000 No. channel estimates
RUNS 120 No. test runs
L 20 No. multipaths components
uA(B)max 30 m/s Vehicles max speeds
uSmax 30 m/s Scatterers max speed
αA(B),l ∼ U [−π,+π] Azimuth angles
βA(B),l ∼ U [0, 1] Elevation angles
α1,l, α2,l ∼ U [−π,+π] Scatterers angles
fc 6 GHz Carrier frequency
wWb 2.958 Weibull scale
aWb 0.428 Weibull shape
the previous attempt, thus avoiding oscillations. Finally, if we533
assume that the algorithm is using a smaller region concerning534
the current channel condition, only defensive thresholds are535





During our tests, every simulation included 50,000 channel539
estimates, repeated for 120 runs to stabilise the resulting540
statistics. Furthermore, the number of multipath components541
was L = 20 to recreate a pure diffuse Rayleigh environment,542
capable of modelling an urban scenario. Since estimates have543
to collected from uncorrelated different coherence region of544
duration Tcoh, we use a fixed maximum probing rate Fp =545
1/Tcoh. Other relevant configuration settings are presented in546
table I.547
In a first set of experiments we evaluated the performance548
of the new thresholding strategies. A standard two-level quan-549
tisation scheme [19] with CASCADE has been modified to550
analytically derive the thresholds using CDF and AFD-based551
formulae presented in section IV. Figures 7 and 8 show SBGR552
performances against censor size for different non-reciprocity553
configurations modelled by standard deviation σC . Results554
are shown in table II where both approaches outperform the555
standard one in all scenarios, especially with worse reciprocity.556
Performances are substantially equivalent, where CDF scores557
slightly better results in correspondence to σC = 0.20 and558
σC = 0.30, whilst AFD results superior in all other setups.559
The same table also illustrates how both analytical strategies560
are able to generate high entropy keys, even in low reciprocity561
environments (σC = 0.30), where STD fails to do so.562
In the second set of experiments, correctness and perfor-563
mance of the Perturb-Observe algorithm have been evaluated564
through extensive simulation. As the baseline, we introduced565
a quantisation scheme, referred to as EX-SEARCH, where the566
thresholds are chosen directly from a lookup table. The latter567
has been created through exhaustive search, containing the568
optimal thresholds for various non-reciprocity settings in the569
range σC ∈ [0.10, 0.30]. Figure 9 shows PO algorithm’s per-570
formance against EX-SEARCH. CDF and AFD configurations571
provide similar results, however, they both outperform EX-572
SEARCH, emphasising the superiority of our self-configurable573








Fig. 7. CDF-thresholding strategy for different non-reciprocity factors.








Fig. 8. AFD-thresholding strategy for different non-reciprocity factors.
approach. In fact, these better results are due to PO’s ability 574
to adapt and exploit the time intervals, where the random 575
estimates temporally allow for a smaller censor size hence, 576
a higher BGR. 577
In the last set of experiments, we applied NIST test suite 578
[13] to the bit-streams generated by our algorithm in order 579
to prove the absence of statistical defects. Each test returns 580
a P-value indicating the strength of the evidence against the 581
null hypothesis. More specifically, when the returned P-value 582
is larger than the chosen significance level (αsig = 0.01), 583
the sequence can be considered as random. Nonetheless, four 584
tests, namely ‘Binary Matrix Rank’, ‘Overlapping Template 585
Matching’, ‘Maurers Universal’ and ‘Linear Complexity’, re- 586
quire an extremely long streams, which cannot be provided 587
by this specific simulator and hence they were excluded. 588
TABLE II
RESULTING SBGR AND ENTROPY OF STD, CDF AND AFD APPROACHES
σC STD CDF AFD
SBGR H SBGR H SBGR H
0.10 0.5309 0.9935 0.5453 (+2.71%) 0.9947 0.5504 (+3.76%) 0.9941
0.15 0.4122 0.9933 0.4188 (+1.60%) 0.9937 0.4270 (+3.59%) 0.9941
0.20 0.2796 0.9934 0.3185 (+13.91%) 0.9940 0.3072 (+9.87%) 0.9932
0.25 0.1946 0.9934 0.2068 (+6.27%) 0.9939 0.2140 (+9.97%) 0.9925
0.30 0.1157 0.5252 0.1469 (+26.97%) 0.9942 0.1423 (+22.99%) 0.9920











Fig. 9. Performance of Perturb-Observe algorithm compared to exhaustive
search .
Table III shows the P-values of the different tests for differ-589
ent reciprocity conditions. CDF has occasionally failed the590
‘random excursions’ tests in case of low channel reciprocity,591
whilst AFD proved to be always successful. Despite this,592
both techniques clearly proved to be able to generate random593
sequences, which can be safety used as cryptographic keys.594
VI. CONCLUSIONS595
In this paper, we proposed a new analytical method for the596
generation of quantisation thresholds in the Physical Layer597
Security extraction process from the channel RSS values. In598
contrast to the standard level-crossing approach, the presented599
CDF and AFD techniques guarantee the optimality of the600
entropy of the resulting keys. Additionally, using these meth-601
ods we introduced a quantisation optimisation engine as a602
feedback block in the key generation process. The proposed603
PO algorithm changes the size of the invalid region and604
observes the results to identify the maximum point of the605
SBGR metric, which in turn simultaneously captures both the606
bit generation rate and the bit mismatch rate. Although the607
techniques discussed apply to different wireless propagation608
environments, the use of VANETs in an urban environment609
has been chosen as the use-case in this work. We implemented610
a three-dimensional stochastic model of a V2V channel, in-611
cluding the interaction between mobile scatterers as well as,612
first and second-order statistics.613
The results obtained proved that the new approaches can 614
better exploit channel randomness and generate a higher 615
number of keys than the existing standard scheme. More 616
importantly, the PO algorithm is capable of adapting to 617
varying reciprocity conditions, which makes it independent 618
of empirical choices of parameters that often do not behave 619
well in scenarios not previously tested. Robustness of the 620
generated keys was tested evaluating their respective Shannon 621
entropies as well as, against the NIST tests suite. In both cases, 622
the resulting sequences are considered as random thus, being 623
resilient to statistical attacks. 624
Further research is recommended in the application of 625
the PO algorithm to various deterministic channel models 626
for VANETS in more specific environments. Moreover, it is 627
desirable to investigate other error correction schemes, besides 628
CASCADE, in order to evaluate their positive or negative 629
impacts on SBGR and investigate further the evolution of the 630
proposed adaptive algorithm. 631
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